nomic preferences in ways that are easily understood and anticipated. International monetary and financial relations are at the center of today's international political economy. Currency values, short-and long-term capital movements, debtor-creditor relations, and related issues are crucial to the private sector, to intergovernmental relations, and to private-public sector interaction around the world. A fundamental analytical and practical question for those concerned about the future of the world economy is indeed the extent to which growing international financial ties will lead toward more cooperation among national policy makers, and among nationally-based businesses, or more conflict among them.
The future of international financial relations, and especially the degree of conflict involved in them, is a function of both economic and political considerations. The scholarly literature on the economics of international capital movements grows daily in both quantity and quality. However, this large economic literature is not matched by a comparable body of work on the political factors involved in international money and finance; a political economy approach to the topic is only in its infancy. Just as informed academic and general discussion of international trade conflict and cooperation relies on an integration of economic and political considerations, so too must political economy be brought to bear on the study of international finance to improve the level of debate and the effectiveness of policy.
This essay suggests that the starting point for a political economy of international finance should be the relationship between international investment interests and the foreign economic policy preferences they imply. The argument proceeds in two steps, at different levels of analysis. The general argument is applied briefly to a number of modern creditor countries and sectors, most prominently the United States after World War Two. The United States was a country rich in capital, and its international economic policies reflected the attempt to ensure as high a return as possible to American capital. At a more disaggregated level of analysis, the varied interests of leading sectors of the U.S. economy, with international economic policy preferences that flow from their domestic and international asset positions, provides the basis for an understanding of domestic debates over US foreign economic policy.
The argument and the examples are preliminary and illustrative. The purpose of the essay is only to present the rudiments of a framework for analyzing the domestic and international political economy of interna-Capital Politics 267 tional finance, and to show that the framework fits a stylized review of the evidence. As such, the essay reflects the embryonic nature of attempts to develop a political economy of international finance.
International finance and the international political economy
There are powerful reasons to study the political economy of international capital movements. Economic theory shows that factor movements are substitutes for international trade, and may even perform similar functions more rapidly. If a labor-rich country maximizes its welfare by exporting labor-intensive and importing capital-intensive goods, it does so even more directly by exporting labor and importing capital; the converse holds for a capital-rich country (Mundell I957 ; for related discussions see de Cecco 1976, and Strange, I986) . Trade is only a means to an end, maximizing profits on capital, and exports are only one way of earning profits on foreign activities; it makes as much sense to focus on the end as on the means.
Indeed, international capital markets are today the pivot around which the world economy rotates. The offshore financial markets hold well over a trillion dollars net of inter-bank claims, and hundreds of billions of dollars more are invested abroad in traditional portfolio and direct forms.
International capital movements dwarf international trade in sheer size; by rough estimate, more money flows into and out of the United States in a day than goods in a month. In 1984, even according to the inadequate figures available, American overseas investment income was $87.6 billion on overseas private assets of $795 billion. In the same year, merchandise exports were $220 billion; assuming a generous five percent profit margin on overseas sales, this implied that foreign investment earned American businesses eight times as much as did foreign trade. International economic transactions of this size deserve close attention by scholars, especially since the study of the politics of international investment has a long and instructive history.
Another reason to focus systematically on international monetary and financial relations is that there is substantial evidence that these relations themselves help explain developments in other realms of the international political economy. The most obvious example is the effect of real exchange rates on trade: a significant rise in the real exchange rate often leads to protectionist sentiment from traded goods producers whose competitive position is eroded by the currency's appreciation, while a real depreciation tends to dampen protectionist pressure by improving the competitive position of local producers. One simple illustration of this is contained in However, systemic International Relations has not been very successful at going beyond these observations to more systematic analyses of the international political economy. The problem is simple: the two insights mentioned above can only be brought to bear for real analysis if the preferences of the actors (states) can be specified. Scholarship in the systemic tradition regards states as rational units interacting strategically in the international system, but the units have nothing to be rationalfor, no utility function to maximize. Indeed, the strategic interaction of states in the international economic policy arena cannot be understood without a clear picture of the states' prior preferences: a state that wants to be integrated into the international economy will behave very differently in trade negotiations than one that prefers economic autarky. Some have tried to evade the problem by assuming that states maximize their power or prospects for survival and building up from there (Waltz 1979), but since national power or survival are goals consonant with a myriad of economic policies, the preferences imputed on this basis are ad hoc.
One way to avoid this problem is to focus on specific issue-areas in which national economic preferences appear self-evident. There are many studies on the strategic interaction of debtor nations and creditor banks in which, quite plausibly, both debtors and creditors are assumed to be purely economic utility maximizers: debtors trade off the benefits of unilateral reductions in debt service against the costs of creditor retaliation, while creditors do the opposite, all in the context of implicit or explicit bargaining toward an equilibrium outcome (Crawford, I988, Lipson I985a, and Sachs I984, are representative examples) . Yet this method has not been generalized to other issue-areas, and it is rarely extended to inter-state interaction in more than one issue-area. The domestic-level alternative to systemic International Relations, then, seeks to specify how national economic preferences are derived from bargaining among individuals, firms, and sectors within the nation-state, each of which has preferences derived from its position in society. The analytical bases for this method, which has firm roots in modern political economy, are of course far more developed than systemic interpretations of the international economy. Nevertheless, even at the level of generality of interest to scholars of International Relations the task is extraordinarily complex, since it requires a level of disaggregation sufficient to capture the specifics of various individuals, firms and sectors, and then a reaggregation that is able to assign accurate weights to the relevant actors. This is a daunting task in so detailed and variegated a field as Capital Politics 27I
international trade, since goods differ so enormously; it is only slightly less daunting in international financial matters.
Our second cut is thus to examine the effect of the different international economic situations of various groups within national societies on the making of national policies related to international investment. Socio-economic groups with overseas assets are expected to have different interests from those without, and are expected to exert political pressure on policymakers to protect their international interests. These pressures will be brought to bear in issue areas directly related to international investment, such as international monetary and financial policies, as well as in issue areas that affect returns on international investment indirectly, such as trade policy.
The remainder of this paper is an attempt to develop and apply these intersecting approaches. First we examine how the international investment position of a nation-state as a discrete unit might be expected to affect its interests and actions in bargaining over international monetary policy, cross-border capital movements, and international trade. Then we explore how the international investment positions of various groups within each nation-state might be expected to affect the groups' positions in domestic political bargaining over national foreign economic policies on international monetary, investment, and trade issues. For tractability we look only at countries with net external assets, creditors. This restriction in the scope of the analysis is artificial and limiting, since the existence of creditors implies the existence of debtors, and they can be expected to interact in important ways. However, the discussion of creditor interests and actions is complex enough for a preliminary essay.
'National' creditor interests and the political economy of international finance In the process of economic growth and development, countries pass through a series of stages in their capital accounts. It is intuitively obvious that, inasmuch as economic development involves capital accumulation, the less developed a country is the more poorly endowed with capital it will be, and the more likely the relative capital scarcity will lead to capital imports. There are of course a number of reasons why the process might take the form, not of capital imports, but of an entirely domesticallydriven increase in the country's capital stock and capital-to-labor ratio.
Nonetheless, a few not particularly strong assumptions are enough to ensure that almost any model will reflect the empirical observation that relatively poor countries tend to import capital, while relatively rich ones tend to export it.'
This secular trend can of course be interrupted by shorter-term fluctuations, for example when a wealthy country borrows heavily abroad (the United States in the Reagan years, Weimar Germany) or when a poor country invests abroad (Argentina and Venezuela in the early I 980s). We ignore the fluctuations and focus on the trend. We also begin our analysis not at the beginning, but at the point at which a country ceases to be a debtor and becomes a creditor.
Creditor countries share certain attributes, but it is useful to distinguish between new lenders and mature creditors. The fundamental distinction between the two is the degree to which overseas assets have been accumulated; a specific indicator might be the relationship between new overseas investments and earnings on existing overseas assets.
When a country begins to export capital, its earnings on overseas assets are substantially less than its new overseas loans and investments. Put another way, a new lender pays for most capital exports out of the country's trade surplus. After many years of overseas investment, however, the country's existing stock of foreign assets is large enough that repatriated earnings approach or even surpass new capital exports.2 Earnings from financial and other services directly related to the country's international financial status (insurance and foreign exchange trading, for example) can be added to this. At the point at which the country is, so to speak, living off its existing overseas assets and international financial sector, it is a mature creditor or, in less flattering terms, a rentier state.
A country rich in capital and interested in protecting its overseas investments has a number of interests in international monetary and financial relations. In the global arena, a capital-exporter wants to ensure that capital can move across borders smoothly and without undue interference. This implies a need for formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral, arrangements to facilitate cross-border capital flows. One concern is the adjudication and enforcement of property rights across borders, which can include everything from gunboat diplomacy to investment treaties. Another concern is relatively predictable currency values, whether in the form of the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system, or well-developed forward markets. Creditor countries thus take the lead in maintaining a market for their currency as an international reserve asset, developing international contract law and a mechanism to enforce it, and other such features of financial and monetary stability.
An important aspect of creditor-country status is the financial-center function, by which the country becomes a reliable place for economic agents from other countries to carry out international financial transactions. A financial center's currency must be easily convertible into other currencies and generally trusted, and its financial markets must be strong and reasonably protected from the whims of politicians.
Creditor countries also have important interests in international trade policy. In general, they should be concerned to make their own markets (Clarke I967, Costigliola 1972 , Meyer 1978 .
Since World War Two, multilateral creditor cooperation has evolved along the lines begun in the inter-war period. The IMF-World Bank system has raised the multilateral principles inherent in the BIS to much higher levels, and has come to provide and supervise an extraordinary degree of creditor coordination (Lipson 198I) .
The distinction between new lenders and mature creditors is also useful. It helps explain some of the trade-policy differences among creditor countries, such as why pre-World War One Great Britain was so much more willing to keep its markets open than France or Germany. It also helps explain some of the pattern of evolution in the behavior of creditor nations, such as the gradual shift from moderate neo-mercantilism toward free-trade observed as new lenders become mature creditors.
Thus Great Britain in the mid-igth century, the United States in the I940s, Western Europe since i 960, andJapan in the last decade reflect the transition from aggressive export promotion and moderate to high controls on imports to a reduction in import barriers.
None of this is to imply that there are not problems of competition and coordination among creditor countries. Nor is it to discount the large variations found even where creditor preferences and policies are similar. 
Sectoral creditor interests and the political economy of international finance
Instead of looking more deeply into the strategic interaction of nation-states with creditor interests, we now turn to a less aggregate level of analysis. It is in fact undeniable that a great deal of the interaction among creditor countries, and between creditor and debtor countries, is driven by domestic rather than international politics. There is, for example, copious evidence that in both the British and American cases much of the impetus for their 'hegemonic' international economic policies came from major domestic economic sectors whose interests may not have been identical with those of the nation as a whole. The powerful financial institutions of the City of London are widely regarded as having had a major impact on British international economic policy from the early nineteenth century up to the present; analogous groups, especially American-based international banks and corporations and their employees, have probably played a similar role in the United States. (For some examples, see Cain and Hopkins I980, Helleiner 1977, and Milner 1987.) To speak of countries that are rich in capital can indeed be misleading; the capital does not normally belong to 'the country' but to economic agents in it. In other words, a capital-rich country is one that has more individuals and firms with a great deal of capital than a capital-poor country. This does not imply that all firms and individuals in the country are capital-rich, for the accumulation of capital take place very unevenly. The most accurate inference would be that, in a capital-rich country, the economic agents well-endowed with capital outweigh those that are poor in capital but, presumably, well-endowed with other factors.
A policy that can be deduced to be in the interests of a creditor country is not necessarily in the interests of everyone in that country. There are of course many examples of conflict among particular groups over national economic policies, in creditors as in all nations. The protection of overseas property rights may benefit overseas investors a great deal, and peasants very little, but the costs may fall primarily on peasants drafted and sent abroad to do the protecting.
Our previous discussion of creditor-country interests is thus quite incomplete. We cannot simply assume that because some local firms and investors have overseas assets, policy will reflect the interests of those with overseas assets. Even where we have reason to believe that overseas asset-holders will dominate foreign economic policy, such as where most firms with strong preferences about policy are overseas investors, there is always the possibility that the political process will be dominated by economic actors with interests different from or opposed to those of creditors. A more detailed analysis of creditor-country preferences requires us to consider the conflicting interests of those within creditor
countries. In what follows we discuss some characteristic sectoral interests in creditor countries.
We can distinguish two very broad groups of sectoral interests. First are those whose assets are internationally diversified, and who can thus take advantage of both domestic and overseas investment opportunities. This includes most prominently the creditors themselves, those with existing assets abroad. We define this group to include also those involved in the financial-center functions of a creditor country, whose principal function is to service those with foreign investments. This group should also include producers whose domestic output is competitive on world markets but who have not engaged in overseas investment: those that could invest abroad, but at present have no need to. The second group is made up of import-competing sectors and/or those whose assets are not internationally diversified. This encompasses uncompetitive producers, whose A similar dynamic was at work in Great Britain even at the height of its international creditor status. Industrially-based protectionists, especially supporters of Imperial Preferences, grew steadily stronger after i 88o but were only able to triumph politically, and then only temporarily, in the interwar years. Here, as in Holland, the outcome was not so much national decline as a change in the domestic balance of economic and political power as the nation's role in the world was redefined from that of a new lender to a mature creditor. As British investors built up huge international holdings British industry became increasingly uncompetitive, and sectoral conflicts over monetary and exchange-rate policy were particularly striking. To take one famous example, London's City was a primary pressure group for, and a major beneficiary of, Britain's return to (Eckes I975 and Van Dormael 1978) .
Over the course of the late I940S and early 1950s, however, as the US and world economies returned to normalcy, 'monetarist' groups reas- In virtually all countries, groups with important international economic ties have dominated, while groups for whom the rest of the world was a threat rather than an opportunity have fought for protection. Here too, domestic bargaining continues; perhaps the most striking topic of debate is the future of the European Community as 1992 approaches.
Prudential disclaimers and observations
The framework presented here does not pretend to be a full-blown theory of the laws of motion of the international political economy. There are many issues that the approach does not address, and many questions it does not answer.
As mentioned at the outset, the initial causes of national-level creditor status are not clearly explained. It is especially important to be able to separate the secular or 'natural' evolution of a national economy and sectors within it, from developments that are simply driven by government policy. It would hardly bejustified to regard Great Britain in 19I4, with a century of international investment experience, as equivalent to a country that became a net creditor solely for perverse policy reasonsas some Third World borrowers with overvalued currencies did after I980. The same might be said about the United States today: it clearly is not a 'natural' net debtor. In this regard a distinction between short-and may be useful.
In much the same way, it is hardly satisfactory simply to assert that some sectors are 'natural' overseas investors while others are not. would be enough to make it unnecessary or impossible to borrow or lend. If looked at from this perspective, the potential theoretical explanations of the correlation between per capita national income and the capital account are generally unconvincing: there is no evidence that the propensity to save, or to invest domestically, bears any clear and direct relationship with per capital income levels. Nonetheless, the argument developed here requires only acceptance of observed reality, not rigorous proof that this reality is theoretically possible. A raging debate on a closely related issue began with Feldstein and Horioka (I980); for more general surveys, see Genberg and Swoboda (1985) and Kindleberger (1987) . 2. Because investment income is in the current account and overseas investment is in the capital acount, the two do not cancel each other out in normal balance of payments accounting procedures. It should also be noted that this brief sketch ignores capital inflows and the local earnings of foreigners; net and gross are assumed to be equal for the present purpose.
